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 AUTHOR’S NOTE: As this Article was in production, two important decisions were 
issued that may lessen the impact of Concepcion, at least temporarily.  First, the National 
Labor Relations Board issued D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012).  This decision 
held that an employer, whether unionized or not, violates employees’ right to engage in 
collective action, protected under § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, when it 
requires employees covered by the Act to sign an agreement that precludes them from 
bringing class actions or collective claims.  To the extent this decision stands and is not 
reversed on appeal, it will protect most employees against the Concepcion tsunami.  
However, the D.R. Horton decision will have no impact on consumers and may well be 
reversed on appeal.  Second, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in In re 
American Express Merchants’ Litigation, No. 06-1871-cv, 2012 WL 284518 (2d Cir. Feb. 
1, 2012), recognized an exception to Concepcion when companies’ use of arbitral class 
action waivers would prevent persons from vindicating their rights under federal law.  
Specifically, the Second Circuit held unenforceable an arbitral class action waiver that it 
found would effectively prevent plaintiffs from bringing a federal antitrust claim.  While 
this decision will have an important impact in the Second Circuit, at least unless it is 
reversed, it is not clear how many other courts will recognize this exception to the scope of 
Concepcion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
t is highly ironic but no less distressing that a case with a name 
meaning “conception” should come to signify death for the legal 
claims of many potential plaintiffs.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s five-
to-four decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion1 is proving to 
be a tsunami that is wiping out existing and potential consumer and 
employment class actions.2  This Article will explore the decision; 
how the decision is being interpreted by lower courts; the decision’s 
impact on parties to such litigation; and how, if not legislatively 
limited, this case will substantially harm consumers, employees, and 
perhaps others.  By permitting companies to use arbitration clauses to 
exempt themselves from class actions, Concepcion will provide 
companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and 
other harmful acts without fear of being sued.3  In many contexts, if 
 
1 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and 
Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas, though Justice Thomas also filed a separate 
concurrence. 
2 Concepcion may also have an even broader impact.  For example, it may ultimately be 
used to prevent franchisees from bringing class actions against franchisors.  Cf. 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Franchising, Arbitration and the Future 
of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 275, 277 (2009) (asserting, in the pre-
Concepcion world, that “we do not see the class action as likely to become extinct, or even 
to appear on the endangered species list”).  Concepcion will likely also have a detrimental 
impact on group litigation that is not brought as a class or representative action.  Some 
companies’ arbitration clauses not only preclude plaintiffs from bringing class or 
representative actions but also proscribe plaintiffs from joining their claims together in a 
single lawsuit as is often permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 and comparable state rules of 
civil procedure.  E.g., Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing a clause mandating that “[a]ny arbitration . . . shall be conducted and resolved 
on an individual basis only and not on a class-wide, multiple plaintiff, consolidated, or 
similar basis”); Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., No. C-09-5443 EDL, 2011 WL 
3419499, *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011) (discussing an arbitration clause providing, inter 
alia, that “no arbitration may be joined with any other”).  Concepcion will no doubt be 
used to attempt to block plaintiffs’ unconscionability attacks on such provisions when 
contained in arbitration clauses.  However, this Article will focus specifically on class 
actions rather than these other types of joint claims. 
3 Professor Myriam Gilles has expressed a similar view as to the likely impact of 
Concepcion.  See Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion: From 
Unconscionability to Vindication of Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 4:25 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/author/myriam-gilles (“While more attention was paid to 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, [131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011),] the AT&T ruling is the real game-changer 
for class action litigation, as it permits most of the companies that touch consumers’ day-
to-day lives to place themselves beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by simply 
incorporating class waiver language into their standard-form contracts.”).  For pre-
Concepcion scholarship discussing the use of arbitration as a class action shield, see 
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory 
I
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plaintiffs cannot join together in a class action, lack of knowledge, 
lack of resources, or fear of retaliation will prevent them from 
bringing any claims at all.  As one plaintiffs’ lawyer specializing in 
consumer claims stated, “The ruling opens the door for companies to 
pickpocket $10 at a time from millions of consumers.”4 
I 
THE CONCEPCION DECISION 
In Concepcion the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) preempted lower courts’ use of California’s Discover Bank5 
rule to hold arbitral class action waivers unconscionable.6  The 
Discover Bank rule classifies as unconscionable class action waivers 
contained in consumer contracts of adhesion that would insulate 
companies from claims that they cheated large numbers of consumers 
out of individually small sums of money.7  The Court found that the 
rule effectively requires “the availability of classwide arbitration.”8  
Therefore, stated the Court, the Discover Bank rule “interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme 
inconsistent with the FAA.”9  The Court asserted that by effectively 
allowing any party to a consumer arbitration to demand class-wide 
 
Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1 (2000). 
4 Bob Sullivan, After High Court Ruling, Firms Divide and Conquer in Consumer 
Cases, THE REDTAPE CHRONICLES (Sept. 21, 2011, 7:12 AM), http://redtape.msnbc.msn 
.com/_news/2011/09/21/7863184-after-high-court-ruling-firms-divide-and-conquer-in       
-consumer-cases (quoting David DiSabato, a New Jersey attorney); see also Catherine 
Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2011). 
5 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
6 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
7 As quoted by the Supreme Court, the Discover Bank rule provided: 
“[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in 
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior 
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of 
consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes 
in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or 
willful injury to the person or property of another.’  Under these circumstances, 
such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be 
enforced.” 
Id. at 1746 (quoting Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110) (alteration in original). 
8 Id. at 1748. 
9 Id. 
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arbitration,10 the Discover Bank rule undermines the FAA’s supposed 
purpose of supporting efficient and informal individualized 
arbitration.11 
The Concepcion decision arose from a confused sea of lower court 
decisions regarding the permissibility of using arbitration clauses to 
prevent plaintiffs from bringing consumer and other class actions.12  
The facts of Concepcion were fairly typical of these cases, in that 
plaintiffs’ individual damages were quite small.  Vincent and Liza 
Concepcion argued that AT&T Mobility (AT&TM) defrauded them 
by charging $30.22 for a phone that was advertised to be free.13  
When the Concepcions sought to litigate, AT&TM filed a motion to 
compel arbitration and further argued that the Concepcions could 
arbitrate only individually rather than in a class action.  In California 
and in a number of other jurisdictions, the use of arbitration to 
preclude class actions was often found unconscionable.14  On the 
other hand, numerous other jurisdictions had held that including class 
action waivers in arbitration clauses was not unconscionable.15 
The defendant in Concepcion, AT&TM, successfully argued that 
federal law, specifically the FAA, trumped lower court decisions that 
 
10 Id. at 1750. 
11 The Court asserts that “class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover 
Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”  Id. at 1751.  The Court 
contends that the switch from individual to class arbitration sacrifices the informality, 
speed, and low cost of arbitration and also greatly increases risks to defendants, forcing 
them to settle questionable claims.  Id. at 1751–52. 
12 For discussions of the mixed case law on whether, pre-Concepcion, arbitral class 
action waivers could be unconscionable, see J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond 
Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 1735 (2006).  See also Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not?: 
Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial 
Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215 (2008). 
13 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
14 See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (applying 
California law to hold an arbitral class action waiver unconscionable); see also Skirchak v. 
Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying Massachusetts law to 
find a class action waiver unconscionable as applied to a Fair Labor Standards Act claim); 
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California 
law to hold a class action waiver unconscionable); Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 
2d 1248, 1260 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (applying Washington law to hold an arbitral class 
action waiver unconscionable); Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 
88, 91 (N.J. 2006) (holding an arbitral class action waiver unconscionable under New 
Jersey law). 
15 E.g., Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v. 
CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002); Lloyd v. MBNA Am. 
Bank, N.A., 27 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2002); Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 
1249, 1261 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001). 
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had held that arbitral class action waivers could be unconscionable.  
While Concepcion will have less impact in those jurisdictions that had 
already permitted companies to use arbitration to insulate themselves 
against class actions,16 the analysis that follows shows that 
Concepcion is having a significant impact in those jurisdictions that 
previously allowed unconscionability attacks against arbitral class 
action waivers. 
The reasoning of the majority’s opinion in Concepcion is 
vulnerable to attack on various grounds.17  Critics will likely point 
out, inter alia, that voiding class action waivers in situations in which 
requiring individualized arbitration would be unconscionable is not 
the same as mandating class-wide arbitration, that the Court’s 
decision tramples states’ traditional abilities to establish their own 
rules on unconscionability, that class-wide arbitrations are indeed 
feasible, and that no legislative history or policy argument supports 
the idea that the FAA was passed to protect companies against the 
supposed unfairness of class actions.  While it would in some ways be 
fun to join the attacks on the majority’s analysis, this Article will 
instead focus on the policy impact of the decision, particularly in light 
of how Concepcion is being interpreted by lower courts. 
II 
LOWER COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF CONCEPCION 
When Concepcion was handed down, it was not entirely clear how 
broad its impact might be.  While many thought the decision would 
doom employment and consumer class actions,18 some lawyers and 
commentators suggested ways lower courts might distinguish 
Concepcion and thereby continue to void at least some arbitral class 
 
16 See sources cited supra note 15. 
17 For several such attacks, see Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4; David Horton, 
Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13 (2011), http://colloquy 
.law.northwestern.edu/main/2011/08/unconscionability-wars.html; Judith Resnik, Fairness 
in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. 
Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration 
Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American 
Arbitration, AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1919936. 
18 See Marcia Coyle, Divided Justices Back Mandatory Arbitration for Consumer 
Complaints, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 2011, at 2 (quoting the lawyer for the Concepcions as 
stating, “The decision will make it harder for people with civil rights, labor, consumer and 
other kinds of claims that stem from corporate wrongdoing to join together to obtain their 
rightful compensation.”). 
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action waivers.19  Courts might, for example, find that Concepcion 
preempted only the essentially per se rule in Discover Bank and allow 
consumers or employees to challenge arbitral class action prohibitions 
using evidence and a more traditional unconscionability analysis.20  
Courts could also find that Concepcion did not apply when companies 
would not be forced by state law to participate in class-wide 
arbitration, but rather only to abandon individualized arbitration in 
certain cases.  Courts could limit Concepcion to its unusual facts—
emphasizing that the arbitration clause used by AT&TM was 
extremely pro-consumer.  Courts might limit Concepcion to the 
preemption of the particular unconscionability attack and allow other 
attacks on class action waivers based on public policy or an inability 
to enforce the relevant federal or state statutes.  Or, courts might even 
find that Concepcion does not apply to claims originating in state 
rather than federal court. 
However, while it has been less than a year since the Court issued 
Concepcion, the results in its wake already look grim for the future of 
consumer and employment class actions.  Most courts are rejecting all 
potential distinctions and are instead applying Concepcion broadly as 
a “get out of class actions free” card.21  In case after case, courts are 
 
19 For an example of an excellent brief asking that a court void a class action waiver as 
unconscionable, notwithstanding Concepcion, see Respondents’ Answer Brief on the 
Merits, McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 60 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 2011) (No. 
SC11-514), 2011 WL 4442949.  See also Arthur H. Bryant, Class Actions Are Not Dead 
Yet, NAT’L L.J., June 20, 2011, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id 
=1202497707930 (presenting various arguments for how Concepcion might be 
distinguished by lower courts); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4 (asserting that courts 
may limit the scope of Concepcion to the terms of its highly unusual arbitration provision); 
Jill I. Gross & Christopher Bloch, Arbitration Case Law Update 2011, in ARBITRATION 
CASE LAW UPDATE 2011, at 205, 212 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook 
Series No. B-1899, 2011), WL 1899 PLI/Corp 205 (stating that while there is little doubt 
Concepcion will have a serious adverse impact on consumer class actions, perhaps courts 
will construe Concepcion’s preemptive scope narrowly); S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass 
Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration: The United States and Canada Compared, 37 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1967101 (urging that Concepcion will not lead to the demise of arbitral class actions). 
20 I argued for a narrow interpretation shortly after the issuance of Concepcion.  See 
Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Will Class Actions Survive Ruling by Supreme Court in 
Concepcion?, 12 Class Action Litig. Rep. 1 (BNA) (May 13, 2011) (quoting Sternlight). 
21 Some may note that the cases discussed in this Article come from a limited range of 
jurisdictions and seem to be drawn inordinately from California.  This apparent 
jurisdictional bias reflects the fact that Concepcion raises issues primarily in those 
jurisdictions, particularly California, that formerly voided arbitral class action waivers as 
unconscionable.  In jurisdictions that already precluded unconscionability attacks on 
arbitral class action waivers, Concepcion will have an impact only to the extent that courts 
rely on the decision to foreclose additional attacks on arbitration clauses. 
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now refusing to void arbitral class action waivers in consumer and 
employment cases.22  Specifically, they have found that suits must 
proceed in individualized arbitration rather than class actions in cases 
brought regarding consumer fraud,23 consumer debt,24 violations of 
federal and state wage and hour legislation,25 and unpaid wages.26  As 
interpreted by most courts, Concepcion is destroying virtually all 
possible attacks on arbitral class action waivers.27 
Indeed, rather than finding ways to distinguish Concepcion, a 
number of judges are extending Concepcion’s reasoning to contexts 
not directly discussed by the Court.  For example, in D’Antuono v. 
 
22 Indeed, some courts are rejecting challengers’ unconscionabiity claims without even 
giving them a chance to conduct discovery on the issue.  E.g., Khan v. Orkin 
Exterminating Co., No. C 10-02156 SBA, 2011 WL 4853365 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011).  
But see Alvarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. CIV S-10-2373 WBS GGH, 2011 WL 
4566440 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (granting the petitioner’s motion to compel discovery). 
23 See, e.g., Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., No. C-09-5443 EDL, 2011 WL 
3419499 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011); Murphy v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-06465-JHN-
VBKx, 2011 WL 3319574 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011); In re Gateway LX6810 Computer 
Prods. Litig., No. SACV 10-1563-JST (JEMx), 2011 WL 3099862 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 
2011); In re Apple & AT&T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., No. C-10-02553 RMW, 
2011 WL 2886407 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2011); Bernal v. Burnett, No. 10-cv-10917-WJM-
KMT, 2011 WL 2182903 (D. Colo. June 6, 2011); Wallace v. Ganley Auto Grp., No. 
95081, 2011 WL 2434093 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 2011). 
24 Estrella v. Freedom Fin., No. C 09-03156 SI, 2011 WL 2633643 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 
2011); Wolf v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. 10-cv-3338 (NLH)(KMW), 2011 WL 
2490939, at *7 (D.N.J. June 22, 2011) (finding that the claim under the Servicemembers 
Civil Relief Act seeking a prorated refund of advance car lease payments must be 
arbitrated individually); Day v. Persels & Assocs., No. 8:10-CV-2463-T-33TGW, 2011 
WL 1770300, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2011) (stating plaintiffs conceded that 
unconscionability argument fails in light of Concepcion); Bellows v. Midland Credit 
Mgmt., Inc., No. 09CV1951-LAB (WMc), 2011 WL 1691323 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2011). 
25 Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2011); Grabowski v. 
Robinson, No. 10cv1658-WQH-MDD, 2011 WL 4353998 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011); 
Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 10-cv-02272-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 
2791338 (D. Colo. July 15, 2011). 
26 Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., No. C 10-04867 SBA, 2011 WL 4727795 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 30, 2011) (refusing to distinguish unconscionability challenges brought in the 
employment context from those brought in the consumer context); Quevedo v. Macy’s 
Inc., No. CV 09-1522 GAF MANX, 2011 WL 3135052 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2011). 
27 Of course, even Concepcion has not eliminated all attacks that might be made against 
arbitration clauses on other grounds.  E.g., Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocer Co., No. CV 11-
02109 DDP (VBKx), 2011 WL 4104856 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2011) (holding an arbitration 
clause unconscionable on various grounds).  The Chavarria court stated, “Ralphs’ 
arbitration policy lacks any semblance of fairness and eviscerates the right to seek civil 
redress, rendering it a right that exists in name only.  To condone such a policy would be a 
disservice to the legitimate practice of arbitration and a stain on the credibility of our 
system of justice.”  Id. at *8. 
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Service Road Corp.,28 a case not involving a class action waiver, the 
district court stated, “While this case does not ultimately turn on 
AT&T Mobility’s holding, this Court cannot overlook that decision 
entirely because its reasoning may be at odds with reasoning in the 
Second Circuit’s recent cases . . . .”29  The court went on to hold that 
an arbitration agreement imposed on exotic dancers was neither 
procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.30  Several other courts 
have applied Concepcion to reject not only unconscionability attacks 
on class action waivers but also arguments that denying plaintiffs 
their class actions would violate state law or public policy,31 that 
arbitral class action waivers prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their 
rights under state law,32 or that class action waivers are not applicable 
as to claims for public injunctive relief brought under California 
law.33 
 
28 789 F. Supp. 2d 308 (D. Conn. 2011). 
29 Id. at 322 (citation omitted). 
30 Id. at 327–29.  The arbitration clause did not include a class action prohibition. 
31 E.g., Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. C 07-00411, 2011 WL 4381748, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (rejecting the argument that arbitral class action waiver might 
be void under “public policy principles of contract law”); In re Gateway LX6810 
Computer Prods. Litig., No. SACV 10-1563-JST (JEMx), 2011 WL 3099862 (C.D. Cal. 
July 21, 2011) (rejecting the argument that a class action waiver might be void under 
various California statutes); Wallace v. Ganley Auto Grp., No. 95081, 2011 WL 2434093 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 2011) (rejecting the argument that policy underlying a Ohio 
consumer protection act might entitle plaintiffs to a class action).  But see Minute Order, 
Anderson v. Apple Am. Grp. LLC, No. 34-2010-00093705-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 16, 2011) (holding that Concepcion did not preclude plaintiffs in an employment 
case from arguing that arbitral class action waiver prevented them from effectively 
vindicating their statutory rights under California labor law). 
32 E.g., Kaltwasser, 2011 WL 4381748, at *4–7 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that 
the arbitral class action waiver should be voided with respect to their consumer fraud 
claims under state law because whereas the plaintiffs had already spent $65,000 on expert 
fees and estimated substantial additional expenditures, the plaintiffs’ individual actual 
damages did not exceed $2000). 
33 E.g., Meyer v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05858 CRB, 2011 WL 4434810 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 23, 2011) (finding that Concepcion means that prior California law precluding 
arbitration of public injunctive relief claims is preempted by the FAA); Arellano v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 1-05663 WHA, 2011 WL 1842712 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) 
(finding that Concepcion broadly trumps public policy arguments, such as that claims for 
public injunctive relief cannot be arbitrated).  But see Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Nos. 
SACV 11-0127 DOC (AJWx), SACV 11-0259 DOC (AJWx), 2011 WL 4852339 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 6, 2011) (refusing to apply Concepcion to overturn a California law permitting 
plaintiffs to litigate rather than arbitrate certain statutory claims for injunctive relief); In re 
DirecTV Early Cancellation Fee Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. ML 09-2093 AG 
(ANx), 2011 WL 4090774, at *9–10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (finding that Concepcion 
did not overrule California case law precluding arbitration of public claims for injunctive 
relief); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding 
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Concepcion is also having a significant retroactive impact.  
Specifically, a number of courts have permitted defendants to raise an 
arbitration defense even in cases that have been pending in litigation 
for as long as several years.  These courts, often California courts 
(since California is where attacks on arbitral class action waivers had 
previously been most successful), reason that Concepcion’s dramatic 
change in the law voids plaintiffs’ claims that defendants waived the 
arbitral defense.34  For example, Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC35 
involved a putative class action, filed in January 2007, in which the 
district court had previously found the contractual arbitration 
agreement unenforceable.36  Nonetheless, while the plaintiff’s motion 
for class certification was still pending, the district court effectively 
reversed its own prior decision and sent the plaintiff back to 
individualized arbitration on his claim that AT&TM falsely advertised 
it was the cellular service provider with “the fewest dropped calls.”37 
Concepcion is also undoubtedly causing many plaintiffs in class 
actions or putative class actions to abandon their claims by entering 
into settlements.  The incentive to settle a claim increases as plaintiffs 
and their attorneys realize that they may or will be forced out of class 
action litigation into individualized arbitration.  While not all 
settlement agreements lead to published decisions, some do.38  
Although it is not possible to examine the extent to which these 
settlements are beneficial to plaintiffs, it reasonably can be inferred 
that many plaintiffs and their attorneys are cutting their losses in light 
of the damage Concepcion wrought to their arguments. 
 
unenforceable a contractual waiver of the right to pursue representative action under 
California’s Private Attorney General Act, notwithstanding Concepcion). 
34 See, e.g., Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., No. C-09-5443 EDL, 2011 WL 
3419499 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011); Morse v. ServiceMaster Global Holdings, Inc., No. C 
10-00628 SI, 2011 WL 3203919 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (multiple individual wage and 
hour claims); Nakano v. ServiceMaster Global Holding Inc., No. C 09-05152 SI, 2011 WL 
3206592 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (same); Bryant v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, No. C 08-01190 SI, 
2011 WL 2709643 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2011); In re Cal. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-
01341 JSW, 2011 WL 2566449 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2011); Villegas v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 
C 10-1762 RS, 2011 WL 2679610 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2011). 
35 No. C 07-00411, 2011 WL 4381748 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011). 
36 Id. at *1.  The prior unconscionability determination had been affirmed by the court 
of appeals.  Kaltwasser v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 350 F. App’x 108, 109 (9th Cir. 2008). 
37 Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2011 WL 4381748, at *1, *2. 
38 E.g., In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., Nos. MDL 2147, 
10 C 2278, 2011 WL 2204584 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2011); Del Rio v. CreditAnswers, LLC, 
No. 10cv346-WQH-BLM, 2011 WL 1869881 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2011). 
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Judges are not necessarily interpreting Concepcion broadly because 
they agree with its analysis.  Rather, readers can almost feel the 
anguish of certain judges who state in their opinions that they would 
have liked to void the class action waiver but felt their hands were 
tied by Concepcion.  For example, one judge stated, while refusing to 
void a class action waiver in a consumer fraud case, “There is no 
doubt that Concepcion was a serious blow to consumer class actions 
and likely foreclosed the possibility of any recovery for many 
wronged individuals.”39  Another judge, refusing to strike down the 
class action waiver that required members of the armed services to 
bring individual arbitration claims to enforce their rights under the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, stated, 
Though [the plaintiff’s] argument and authority [as to 
unconscionability of the class action waiver] are persuasive, the 
Court must take note of the recent decision issued by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion.  
. . . 
 Based on the United States Supreme Court’s holding and 
reasoning in [Concepcion], the Court cannot find that any public 
interest articulated in this case, either in connection with the SCRA 
or New Jersey law, overrides the clear, unambiguous, and binding 
class action waiver included in the parties’ arbitration agreement.40 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, 
LLC41 exemplifies many courts’ broad interpretation of Concepcion.  
In Cruz, plaintiffs—customers of AT&TM and covered by the same 
arbitration clause discussed in Concepcion42—brought a class action 
 
39 Bernal v. Burnett, No. 10-cv-01917-WJM-KMT, 2011 WL 2182903, at *7 (D. Colo. 
June 6, 2011).  Judge William Martínez rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the adhesive 
nature of the arbitration contracts imposed rendered them unconscionable when he stated, 
Plaintiffs’ argument has considerable validity and the Court would likely have 
found that the Arbitration Agreements at issue here [were] unconscionable . . . if 
it were issuing this decision pre-Concepcion.  But the Court has to take the legal 
landscape as it lies and cannot ignore the Supreme Court’s clear message. . . .  In 
Concepcion, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that arbitration agreements are 
per se unconscionable when found in adhesion contracts. . . .  As a result, this 
Court has no alternative but to discount the weight to be attributed to the 
adhesive nature of the Arbitration Agreements at issue here. 
Id. at *6.  And the same judge, in a wage and hour case, expressed similar sentiments.  
Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 10-CV-02272-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 
2791338, at *6 (D. Colo. July 15, 2011). 
40 Wolf v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. 10-cv-3338 (NHL)(KMW), 2011 WL 
2490939, at *6–7 (D.N.J. June 22, 2011). 
41 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011). 
42 Id. at 1210–11. 
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consumer fraud claim regarding small hidden charges.43  The 
plaintiffs sought to distinguish Concepcion in several ways.  First, 
they argued that unlike the Concepcion plaintiffs, they had specific 
evidence showing they would be unable to vindicate their rights 
absent a class action.44  Second, rather than arguing that the class 
action waiver was unconscionable, the plaintiffs asserted that the 
waiver violated public policy because it would defeat the remedial 
purpose of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.45  
Third, the plaintiffs pointed out that because of the “blow up” 
clause46 contained in the arbitration provision, there was no risk that 
the defendant would be forced into the class-wide arbitration that the 
Supreme Court in Concepcion found so objectionable.47  The 
Eleventh Circuit rejected all of these arguments, finding that the 
arguments had already been considered and rejected by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  “The Plaintiffs’ evidence goes only to substantiating 
the very public policy arguments that were expressly rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Concepcion—namely, that the class action waiver 
will be exculpatory, because most of these small-value claims will go 
undetected and unprosecuted.”48 
Cruz did identify one small window through which future 
claimants might try to crawl.  Perhaps, it recognized, future claimants 
might try to invalidate an arbitral class action waiver “on public 
policy grounds where it effectively prevents the claimant from 
vindicating her statutory cause of action.”49  Here Cruz cited a line of 
Supreme Court cases that endorse the idea that arbitration agreements 
may not be enforceable when they prevent claimants from vindicating 
their rights.  Specifically, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
 
43 Id. at 1208. 
44 Id. at 1213–15.  Specifically, plaintiffs made a factual record including “affidavits of 
three Florida consumer law attorneys who attested that they would not represent 
consumers on an individual basis in pursuing their . . . claims against AT[&]TM.”  Id. at 
1214.  Plaintiffs also presented statistical evidence that they said showed the 
“infinitesimal” percentage of AT&TM subscribers who had ever arbitrated a dispute with 
AT&TM, which evidence the Eleventh Circuit said had also been presented in 
Concepcion.  Id. (asserting that “only 0.000007% of AT[&]TM customers filed a notice of 
dispute against AT[&]TM”). 
45 Id. at 1207. 
46 This clause provided that if the class action waiver “is found to be unenforceable, 
then the entirety of this arbitration provision shall be null and void.”  Id. 
47 Id. at 1213. 
48 Id. at 1214. 
49 Id. at 1215.  Professor Myriam Gilles also discussed this possible line of attack in a 
recent blog.  Gilles, supra note 3. 
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Plymouth, Inc.50 required an automobile franchisee to arbitrate a 
claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act stating, “[S]o long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve 
both its remedial and deterrent function.”51  A later case, Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Randolph,52 enforced the challenged arbitration 
clause but recognized that when a claimant could establish that “large 
arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively 
vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum,”53 the 
results would be different.54  However, the Eleventh Circuit found in 
Cruz that the plaintiffs could not establish that their rights could not 
be vindicated because the Supreme Court in Concepcion had already 
“examined this very arbitration agreement and concluded that it did 
not produce such a result.”55  The Eleventh Circuit also noted that this 
“vindication of rights” argument might not necessarily apply to state 
as opposed to federal statutory causes of action.56 
While Cruz at least took some pains to limit the scope of its ruling, 
a few recent rulings have interpreted Concepcion even more broadly 
also to block the “vindication of rights” argument.  In Kaltwasser v. 
AT&T Mobility LLC57 the plaintiff argued that the arbitral class action 
waiver was void because he could not realistically pursue his 
consumer fraud claim individually in that his expert fees would 
exceed $165,000 and his maximum recovery would be only $2000.58  
The district court rejected the argument, however, on three grounds.  
First, the court found that the Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
 
50 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
51 Id. at 637. 
52 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
53 Id. at 90. 
54 Id. 
55 Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1215 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)).  In future cases, courts, including perhaps 
the Supreme Court, will need to decide whether the “effectively vindicates” language 
protects the rights of absent class members as well as named plaintiffs. 
56 Id. (citing Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 79, 81–83 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) 
(severing a portion of an arbitration clause that was inconsistent with state law); cf. 
Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements––With 
Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 270–
72 (2006) (asserting that the “effectively vindicate” argument ought to apply only to 
federal and not to state-law claims, given the preemptive scope of the FAA). 
57 No. C 07-00411, 2011 WL 4381748 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011). 
58 Id. at *4. 
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Randolph59 “vindication of rights” argument may not apply to claims, 
such as Kaltwasser’s, brought under state rather than federal law.60  
Second, the court concluded that even if Green Tree applies to state 
claims, “the notion that arbitration must never prevent a plaintiff from 
vindicating a claim is inconsistent with Concepcion,” and that had the 
majority intended to allow such an argument it would have so 
stated.61  Third, the court also expressed its view that the “vindication 
of rights” argument would be unworkable as an administrative matter 
because the argument would require courts to consider the viability of 
individuals’ claims on a case-by-case basis.62 
A very few decisions have bucked lower courts’ general trend of 
interpreting Concepcion broadly to prevent plaintiffs from voiding 
arbitral class action waivers.  For example, one federal district court 
refused to apply Concepcion to prevent plaintiffs from bringing a 
Title VII pattern and practice claim collectively, notwithstanding 
Concepcion.63  Specifically, the court confirmed its earlier pre-
Concepcion ruling that because denying the plaintiffs a class action 
would prevent the plaintiffs from enforcing their right to be free of 
pattern and practice discrimination in violation of Title VII,64 the 
arbitral class action prohibition could not be enforced.65  The court 
reasoned that in the Second Circuit, at least, a plaintiff cannot pursue 
a pattern and practice Title VII discrimination claim individually but 
 
59 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that an arbitral fee precluded her 
from vindicating her rights under federal law but suggesting that an arbitration clause 
might be voided on that ground if the plaintiff were able to make a stronger factual 
showing). 
60 Kaltwasser, 2011 WL 4381748, at *5 (noting a circuit split on the issue).  Compare 
Stutler v. T.K. Constructors Inc., 448 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that the Green 
Tree “vindication of rights” principle applies to claims brought only under federal 
statutes), with Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that 
arbitration clauses can be invalid when they prevent vindication of rights under state and 
federal law). 
61 Kaltwasser, 2011 WL 4381748, at *5. 
62 Id. at *6.  The district court did not explain why such fact-specific findings are more 
unworkable than inquiries regularly performed by courts in other contexts.  See also 
Meyer v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05858 CRB, 2011 WL 4434810 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
23, 2011) (rejecting, without discussion, the plaintiffs’ argument that the arbitral class 
action waiver would prevent them from vindicating their statutory rights). 
63 Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2011 WL 
2671813 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011). 
64 The arbitration clause did not explicitly preclude the plaintiffs from bringing a class 
action. However, the court interpreted Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International 
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010), to prevent the plaintiffs from bringing a class action.  Chen-
Oster, 2011 WL 2671813, at *1. 
65 Id. at *4–5. 
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rather must do so in a class action.66  Therefore, explained the court, 
forcing plaintiffs to proceed individually in arbitration would deprive 
them of their rights under federal law, which distinguished the case 
from Concepcion.67 
Similarly, a California appellate court found that arbitral class 
action waivers could not be applied to representative claims brought 
under California’s Private Attorney General Act (PAGA).68  The 
court explained that whereas class actions allow individuals to 
vindicate their private rights, the PAGA representative action instead 
protects public rights in that “the aggrieved employee acts as the 
proxy or agent of state labor law enforcement agencies.”69  Thus, 
reasoned the court, Concepcion does not apply to such actions.  The 
California court further observed that PAGA claims do not require 
some of the class action features (e.g., notice or opt out) that the 
Supreme Court found troubling to apply in arbitration in 
Concepcion.70  In short, stated the California court, “Until the United 
States Supreme Court rules otherwise, we continue to follow what we 
believe to be California law.”71  However, note that even these cases, 
which have refused to extend Concepcion to certain contexts, have 
not permitted unconscionability attacks on class action waivers in the 
employment or consumer context.72  Thus, Concepcion is giving 
 
66 Id. at *3. 
67 While recognizing that the Second Circuit or Supreme Court might ultimately apply 
Concepcion broadly to deny the Cruz plaintiffs their class action and force them into 
arbitration, the court found that for now, at least, the district court should apply the law as 
it is and not as it might become.  Id. at *5. 
68 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–2699.5 (West 2011).  The PAGA allows claimants to bring 
actions seeking civil penalties on their own behalf, or on behalf of current or former 
employees, where employers have violated the California Labor Code. 
69 Brown v. Ralph’s Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 861 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756 v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 
2009)). 
70 Id. at 863. 
71 Id.  Not all courts have agreed.  See, e.g., Meyer v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-
05858 CRB, 2011 WL 4434810 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011); Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, 
Inc., No. C 1-05663 WHA, 2011 WL 1842712 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011). 
72 In Brown, an employment case, the plaintiffs had argued that the arbitral class action 
waiver was unconscionable, and the lower court so found.  128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 857.  On 
appeal, however, the court reversed on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to make the 
specific factual showing of unconscionability required in Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 
P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007).  Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 859.  Thus, stated the court, “we do not 
have to determine whether, under [Concepcion], the rule in Gentry concerning the 
invalidity of class action waivers in employee-employer contract arbitration clauses is 
preempted by the FAA.”  Id. (citations omitted).  One unpublished decision, Teimouri v. 
Macys Inc. (Cal. Super. Aug. 18, 2011) (decision on file with author), has gone on to hold 
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companies far greater power than they previously had to use arbitral 
class action waivers to protect themselves from class actions. 
III 
THE IMPACT OF CONCEPCION AND ITS PROGENY 
To date Concepcion is having a huge impact only on those 
companies that had the foresight to impose arbitral class action 
waivers on their consumers, employees, or others.  Such companies, 
as we have seen, are using their waivers to block ongoing as well as 
proposed class actions.73  However, prior to Concepcion, not all 
companies had used arbitration clauses to impose class action 
waivers.  The use of such clauses varied by industry, by jurisdiction, 
and by time period.  A 2001 study showed that thirty-five percent of 
the consumer contracts in an average California consumer’s life 
required arbitration,74 and thirty-one percent of those excluded class 
actions.75  On the other hand, a more recent study showed that 
seventy-five percent of studied consumer contracts contained 
arbitration clauses, all of which contained class action waivers.76 
 
that Concepcion does not preempt a fact-specific claim that a class action waiver is 
unconscionable in the labor context. 
73 See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (discussing retroactive uses of 
Concepcion). 
74 Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004).  Another more recent study of twenty-one companies 
with substantial name recognition or market share in the areas of telecommunications, 
credit, or financial services found that over seventy-five percent of the companies imposed 
mandatory arbitration on their consumers, and that every consumer arbitration contract 
included a waiver of class actions.  Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer 
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 880–83 (2008); cf. Christopher R. Drahozal & 
Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 468–69 (2010) (asserting that the particular industries studied by 
Eisenberg et al. are particularly likely to impose mandatory arbitration and limit 
consumers’ access to class actions, and suggesting that a broader look at consumer 
contracts would yield a very different picture). 
75 Demaine & Hensler, supra note 74; see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. 
Wittrock, Franchising, Arbitration, and the Future of the Class Action, 3 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 275, 288 (2009) (reporting that less than half of franchise 
agreements studied in 1999 and 2007 contained arbitration clauses, and that 53.6% of 
those in 1999 and 78.6% of those in 2007 contained class action waivers). 
76 Eisenberg et al., supra note 74, at 882–84; see also Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 
75 (finding wide variation in the uses of arbitration and class action waivers across various 
types of business). 
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In the near future, we can expect that even more companies will 
impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate themselves 
from class actions because Concepcion has changed the calculus.  
Prior to Concepcion, some companies may have feared that inserting 
an arbitral class action waiver would backfire—leading them into lots 
of costly litigation over the viability of the clause and perhaps 
ultimately being held invalid by the courts.77  Now, however, 
Concepcion and its progeny are giving companies reason to believe 
that an arbitral class action waiver would be upheld, so it is likely that 
many more companies will choose to impose such waivers. 
For those companies that fear being sued in class actions it will be 
quite easy to insert class action waivers into small-print documents or 
online provisions that they send or make available to their customers 
or employees.  Under the FAA, an arbitration clause need not even be 
signed to be valid, so long as it is written.78  For example, Starbucks 
recently updated the online terms and conditions associated with its 
gift cards to require that any consumers resolve disputes pertaining to 
the cards using individual arbitration in Seattle, rather than 
litigation.79  Companies will also have no problem amending 
relationships with existing customers or employees, as most courts 
that have considered the question have allowed such changes to 
ongoing relationships.80  Thus, given that most companies would 
prefer not to be sued in class actions, we may soon see the possibility 
of class actions only in rare contexts in which the company and 
potential plaintiffs do not have a prior relationship.  For example, it 
might not be possible for a trucking company to avoid a class action 
that arises out of an accidental spill of toxic chemicals on the 
highway, in that the company has no way of predicting who might be 
a potential plaintiff.  However, you can be sure that creative attorneys 
are working already to think about how to impose arbitration and thus 
class action waivers on pharmaceutical customers, recipients of 
 
77 See Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 75, at 290–93 (outlining the diverse approaches 
courts took to arbitral class action waivers prior to Concepcion). 
78 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
79 STARBUCKS CARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks 
.com/card/card-terms-and-conditions (last visited Jan. 1, 2012). 
80 Occasionally consumers or employees have tried to argue that revising an ongoing 
relationship to require arbitration does not result in an enforceable agreement, but courts 
often find that consumers consented to arbitration by continuing to use a product or 
service, and that employees consented to the revised clause by continuing to work at the 
job.  See, e.g., F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: 
ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER TOPICS § 5.2.3.3 (5th ed. 2007). 
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medical devices, and perhaps even concertgoers.  For example, even 
prior to Concepcion a Whataburger franchisee in East Texas had 
sought to bind its customers to arbitration by posting a sign on the 
door stating: 
Arbitration Notice 
By entering these premises, you hereby agree to resolve any and all 
disputes or claims of any kind whatsoever, which arise from the 
products, services or premises, by way of binding arbitration, not 
litigation.  No suit or action may be filed in any state or federal 
court.  Any arbitration shall be governed by the FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT, and administered by the American 
Mediation Association.81 
Perhaps pill bottles, concert tickets, and implant inserts will soon all 
contain similar statements? 
Assuming that arbitral class action waivers become more 
widespread, what impact will this have?  We can expect to see an 
impact on prospective defendants, representative plaintiffs, absent 
class members, and society at large.  Each of these impacts will be 
briefly discussed below. 
A.  Impact of Concepcion on Defendants 
Many prospective defendants will be thrilled rather than troubled 
by the prospect of a new virtually class-action-free world.82  Such 
companies often argue, as they did in amicus briefs in Concepcion, 
that class actions are extremely expensive and burdensome for 
companies,83 and that they allow plaintiffs and their attorneys to use 
 
81 Stephanie Mencimer, Eat Burger, Waive Right to Sue, MOTHERJONES (Jan. 31, 2008, 
9:07 AM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2008/01/eat-burger-waive-right-sue. 
82 In a fascinating blog, Charles Silver and Maria Glover have noted that upon occasion 
companies may actually prefer to be sued in class actions rather than individually.  Maria 
Glover & Charles Silver, Zombie Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 10:16 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/zombie-class-actions.  These commentators 
have recognized that at times a company is better off settling claims with a class (on the 
cheap of course) than litigating many individual claims.  Yet Concepcion may serve the 
interests of these defendants as well because even having forced plaintiffs to waive their 
class claims the company can reverse course, waive its own objection to class claims 
brought by friendly class counsel, and thereby enter into a cozy settlement that eradicates 
the potential claims of individual claimants.  Silver and Glover call this the creation of 
“zombie” classes “whose mission will be to feed on and suck the life from live claims.”  
Id. 
83 Brief of the Center for Class Action Fairness as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 
2010 WL 3167314; Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
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the cost of class actions to extort settlements from companies with 
little or no liability.84  Such companies have, with some success, been 
seeking to use legislation and rule changes to rein in class actions for 
many years.85  However, by using the private tool of arbitration, 
corporate defenders will be able to achieve far more than they have 
been able to achieve through Congress or the federal and state rules 
committees: the total elimination of class actions in many contexts.  
These defendants will largely say “good riddance” to class actions.86 
B.  Impact of Concepcion on Named Plaintiffs 
Concepcion and its progeny will affect putative named plaintiffs by 
requiring them to pursue their claims individually in arbitration rather 
than as part of a class in either litigation or arbitration.  There may be 
some debate as to whether or not this change will harm the named 
plaintiffs.  Some claim that arbitration will afford greater access to 
justice than litigation, perhaps even including class actions.87  
Asserting that arbitration is quicker and cheaper than litigation, some 
say that victims of discrimination or consumer fraud will be able to 
present their claims more effectively in arbitration than they would in 
 
1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 673841; Brief of Amici Curiae DIRECTV, Inc., 
Comcast Corp., and Dell Inc. in Support of Petitioner, AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3183855; Brief of DRI––The 
Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3183854. 
84 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Concepcion accepted this argument.  131 S. Ct. at 
1751 (noting that in class actions “defendants will be pressured into settling questionable 
claims,” and referring to “in terrorem” settlements). 
85 For example, the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 USC §§ 1711–1715 (2006), allowed 
the transfer of many class actions from state to federal court in the hope that federal courts 
would be less generous in certifying class actions.  Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2008); 
Edward F. Sherman, Decline & Fall, 93 A.B.A. J. 51 (2007).  Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure was also amended during this same time period.  See generally 
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475 
(2005); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791897; Francis E. McGovern, 
Common Themes and Unintended Consequences in Class Action Reform, 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1107 (2005). 
86 As noted supra note 82, to the extent that defendants prefer to allow class action 
settlements, they can waive their opposition to the arbitral or litigated class action. 
87 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: 
A Critique of Public Citizen’s Jeremaiad on the “Costs of Arbitration,” DISP. RESOL. J., 
Nov. 2002/Jan. 2003, at 8, 14 (asserting that arbitration offers the average citizen a more 
realistic remedy than does the public court system). 
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litigation.88  They urge that litigation may be beneficial for attorneys 
but not for claimants.89  In Concepcion itself the Supreme Court 
examined an ingenious arbitration clause that was created to provide 
the impression that consumers who sought to bring claims against 
AT&TM would be assured access to justice.  The clause states that 
AT&TM must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims and pay a 
minimum of $7500 plus double attorneys’ fees to any claimant who 
received an arbitration award greater than AT&TM’s last written 
settlement offer.90  Yet, even as to the named plaintiffs (and certainly 
as to absent class members, as will be discussed), the clause sounds 
better than it is.  What lawyer can afford to take a $30 or other small 
claim on the gamble that the defendant would be stupid enough not to 
settle a winning claim and therefore risk having to pay $7500 and 
double attorneys’ fees?  And can individual claimants really do well 
in arbitrating a consumer fraud claim if they have to represent 
themselves?91  Also, with respect to many kinds of claims, it may not 
be practical for plaintiffs to proceed individually, rather than 
collectively. 
Plaintiffs also argue that if they are not allowed to proceed as a 
class—either in arbitration or through this lawsuit—they will not be 
able to pursue their claims.  They assert that the nature of the claims 
(e.g., fraud) takes time and upfront work to develop, and that no 
attorney will be willing or able to do that on an individualized basis. 
They also contend that the confidential, non-precedential nature of 
 
88 Id.; see also Amy Schmitz, Arbitration Ambush in a Policy Polemic, 3 PENN ST. Y.B. 
ON ARB. & MED. 52, 86, 91–92 (2011) (stating that “evidence suggests that consumers 
may fare better in arbitration than in litigation,” but also noting that abolition of class 
actions can be problematic for consumers). 
89 Id.  Some also argue that even assuming class actions would be more beneficial for 
named plaintiffs than would individualized arbitration, once an injury has occurred, in 
contrast, on an ex ante basis all consumers and plaintiffs would be better off accepting 
arbitration.  The argument is that by accepting arbitration sans class actions, consumers 
and employees would receive all or part of the cost savings and wage increases that 
companies realize by eliminating class actions, and that these benefits exceed the expected 
benefit of bringing a class action rather than bringing an individual claim in arbitration.  
Ware, supra note 56, at 276–77.  However, we do not know how these costs and benefits 
compare, we do not give consumers and employees this choice, and we have no reason to 
believe that consumers and employees could knowingly choose between these options.  
See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003) (discussing psychological biases that 
prevent people from making rational choices as to contract terms). 
90 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
91 See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381, 418 (2010) (suggesting that claimants may often need 
representation in mediation and arbitration). 
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arbitration will make it impossible to pursue these claims on an 
individualized basis, as their strongest witnesses—former employees 
of defendants—would be forced to testify over 800 times.92 
In short, the proposition that arbitration is quicker and cheaper than 
litigation neglects to consider the fact that you get what you pay for.  
Litigation is often time consuming and expensive because claimants 
need representation by attorneys and discovery to prevail on their 
claims of discrimination or consumer fraud.93 
C.  Impact of Concepcion on Absent Class Members 
The impact of Concepcion on prospective absent class members 
will be even more significant than its impact on prospective named 
plaintiffs.  In particular, we can expect that Concepcion will 
altogether eliminate the claims of most absent class members unless 
they can somehow suddenly and timely bring their own individual 
claims.  But no one can seriously suggest that absent class members 
will bring individual actions that will replace class actions. 
The idea that individual arbitration might adequately replace class 
actions neglects to consider one of the major but too-little-discussed 
virtues of class actions—they allow people to be represented as to 
claims they may not have known they had.94  Even the fairest of 
individual arbitration clauses cannot help consumers or employees 
who do not know they have been wronged.  Class actions, in contrast, 
allow a single knowledgeable victim to bring a lawsuit on behalf of 
all those similarly situated.95  In this busy, complex world most of us 
lack the time or ability to figure out that we are being victimized by 
fraud, discrimination, negligence, or other misdeeds.  The harm may 
be real and may violate the law; but especially when victims are 
harmed only in small or imperceptible ways—for example, by 
inappropriate fees, defective computer software, exposure to toxic 
substances, or denial of overtime pay—many victims will simply not 
 
92 Bernal v. Burnett, No. 10-cv-01917-WJM-KMT, 2011 WL 2182903, at *7 (D. Colo. 
June 6, 2011).  The Bernal court stated that it was “sympathetic” to this argument but 
nonetheless bound by Concepcion not to void the arbitral class action waiver. 
93 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing 
Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2004) 
(finding that formal, complex, expensive dispute resolution processes are best for 
resolving some kinds of disputes, whereas informal processes best serve other interests). 
94 Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 88–90 (2004). 
95 Id. 
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realize that they have been harmed, much less harmed in violation of 
a law.96  Indeed, even victims of larger or clearer wrongs may lack 
the knowledge that they have been harmed in an unlawful way, at 
least unless they can afford to see an attorney who might so inform 
them. 
The high cost of legal services is a second reason why eliminating 
class actions will, in reality, eliminate the possibility that most absent 
class members would bring claims.  Even a consumer who, perhaps 
through a revelation, came to realize she had been harmed in an 
unlawful fashion, might well not be able to afford to bring an 
individual claim.  As noted above, many individual claims cannot 
realistically be brought without the assistance of an attorney.  
Moreover, there are many costs to bringing individual claims besides 
the cost of hiring an attorney.  The individual who chooses to bring a 
case, even in arbitration, must give up a substantial amount of time 
and peace of mind.  In employment cases, individuals who choose to 
bring lawsuits against their employer may face retaliation.97  By 
contrast, absent class members need not pay for representation or 
endure many emotional or other costs of bringing a claim.  As one 
defender of class action waivers has recognized, employing such 
waivers may reduce the value of aggregatable claims to zero, as many 
claims are not worth pursuing except as part of a class action.98 
Available evidence suggests that very few consumers will choose 
to bring individual arbitration claims against a company.  Affidavits 
submitted in Concepcion stated that “[f]ewer than 200 of AT&T’s 
millions of customers brought claims in individual arbitration against 
the company for any reason, compared to thousands who sought help 
from a consumer group for the specific claims alleged in Coneff.”99  
Similarly, one credit card company, First USA, revealed that in the 
two years after it implemented its mandatory arbitration clause in 
early 1998, only four consumers had filed arbitration claims against 
 
96 See Glover, supra note 85 (manuscript at 28–29) (observing that particular kinds of 
claims, such as those relating to consumer finance, are particularly difficult for wronged 
individuals to recognize because identification of the wrong may require analysis of large 
sets of data, comparative analysis, or technical expertise). 
97 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 76 (noting the importance of class actions as a 
means to elude fears of retaliation). 
98 Ware, supra note 56, at 276–77. 
99 Brief of Amici Curiae Marygrace Coneff, et al. in Support of Petitioner at 9, AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3973886, at 
*9. 
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the company.100  If a single class action had been brought against 
First USA the action would potentially have aided many class 
members.  Thus, it is clear that absent class members will lose their 
claims if companies are allowed to evade class action suits. 
D.  Impact of Concepcion on the Public 
How will the public be impacted if prospective defendants are able 
to use arbitral class action waivers without fearing unconscionability 
attacks?101  For starters, we are likely to see a substantial reduction in 
the number of class actions brought in federal and state court.  While 
good empirical data on numbers of class actions are notoriously 
scarce,102 a report by the Federal Judicial Center showed that in 2007 
more than 1500 labor class actions (mostly FLSA) and consumer 
fraud class actions were filed in or removed to federal court, making 
up 67.7% of the federal class action docket.103  In the future, as more 
companies realize that they can use arbitral class action waivers to 
protect themselves from class actions, we can expect fewer and fewer 
claims.  This reduction in the number of class actions will certainly 
decrease the extent to which companies are deterred from engaging in 
illegal conduct. 
Proponents will defend this elimination of class actions, perhaps 
arguing that most class actions present weak legal claims, that class 
actions are not beneficial for class members, that arbitration can be 
structured to ensure greater access to justice than is provided by class 
actions, that government enforcement actions can take the place of 
any worthy class actions, or that any benefits of class actions are 
outweighed by their detriments.  Yet, these arguments all fail. 
It is no doubt true that some class actions present weak substantive 
claims, and that some class actions serve the interests of plaintiffs’ 
counsel or defendants more than the actions serve the interests of 
plaintiffs.  On the other hand it is also true that many class actions 
 
100 In contrast, First USA itself filed 51,622 arbitration claims against consumers in the 
same period.  See Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?: Arbitration Forum’s 
Rulings Called One-Sided, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at E1. 
101 For a fascinating discussion of broad public policy concerns impacted by the 
substantial elimination of class actions, see Resnik, supra note 17 (discussing concerns of 
fairness, access to justice, and the role of courts in a democratic order). 
102 Gail E. Lees et al., 2009: First-Quarter Update on Class Action Trends, 10 Class 
Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 24, 2009). 
103 See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF 
THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), available at 
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/cafa1108.pdf. 
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serve the interests of both plaintiffs and members of the public, 
protecting them against illegal and unfair business practices.  
Congress, as well as federal and state rules committees, have been 
working hard to revise class action procedures to ensure that class 
actions function as fairly and effectively as possible.  These groups, 
rather than companies themselves, are best positioned to weigh the 
benefits and drawbacks of class actions and refine the rules as needed.  
We should not allow companies to shortcut the legislative process by 
using arbitration to abolish class actions.104 
If we allow companies to insulate themselves from class actions, 
we are effectively allowing companies to escape many legal 
regulations and thereby eliminating a great deterrent to company 
misconduct.  As we have seen above, it is unrealistic to expect absent 
class members to bring individual claims.105  Nor is it realistic to 
assume that federal or state enforcement agencies can pick up the 
slack and bring all necessary actions to enforce federal and state 
consumer and employment laws.  Those agencies have never been 
particularly well funded,106 and now in these times of economic 
hardship are even less able to bring many enforcement actions.107  
Unlike many European countries, we have chosen to use private 
lawsuits to enforce many of our laws.108  Unless we substantially 
strengthen government enforcement efforts, which seems presently 
unlikely, eliminating class actions will simply take the teeth out of 
many of our substantive laws.  As one author notes, “[P]rivate parties, 
at least as a functional matter, are often necessary for meaningful 
enforcement of regulatory directives to occur.”109  For those who 
believe that our existing substantive laws do serve the public interest, 
eliminating enforcement of those laws will not benefit society. 
 
104 Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631 (2005) (arguing that it is unjust to allow companies to deregulate themselves). 
105 See supra Part III.C. 
106 See Glover, supra note 85 (manuscript at 11) (stating that “for most pubic regulatory 
bodies, scarce resources are the rule, not the exception”). 
107 See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: 
Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603 (2008) (discussing the 
relationship between class actions and the regulatory state). 
108 See Glover, supra note 85. 
109 Id. (manuscript at 15). 
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CONCLUSION 
In short, if we allow lower courts’ interpretations of Concepcion to 
effectively eliminate most consumer and employment class actions, 
we are providing companies with licenses to cheat and harm almost at 
will.  If courts do not change their approach and begin to construe 
Concepcion more narrowly, we will need to look to Congress and 
perhaps the executive branch for alternative solutions to this 
problem.110 
Congress could step in to counter Concepcion in several ways.  For 
example, Congress could pass the proposed Arbitration Fairness 
Act,111 which would prevent companies from imposing mandatory 
arbitration on consumers and employees.112  If companies cannot 
impose mandatory arbitration they also cannot use mandatory 
arbitration to abolish class actions.  Alternatively, Congress might 
devise a more limited “fix” to Concepcion itself, amending the FAA 
to clarify that arbitration clauses cannot be used to eliminate class 
actions.113 
Federal executive agencies can also take some steps to protect 
individuals and the public at large from the excesses of Concepcion.  
Several agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission,114 the 
Securities and Exchange Commission,115 and the new Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection116 are already considering regulating 
 
110 Of course, even if courts were to construe Concepcion as narrowly as possible, the 
decision itself would remain a major impediment to consumer and perhaps also 
employment class actions.  For additional ideas on how to potentially improve consumers’ 
access to justice, see Stipanowich, supra note 17. 
111 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). 
112 Id. 
113 Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and 
the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 498–99 
(2011) (advocating for the passage of the Consumer Class Action and Class Arbitration 
Waiver Reform Act in lieu of the Arbitration Fairness Act). 
114 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING 
CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf. 
115 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act granted authority 
to the SEC to restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements between customers and 
securities brokers-dealers.  15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-5(f) (West Supp. 2010) (Authority to 
Restrict Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration). 
116 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act directs the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to report on “the use of agreements providing for 
arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and consumers” and also grants 
authority to restrict such agreements.  12 U.S.C.A. § 5518 (West 2010) (Authority to 
Restrict Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration). 
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mandatory arbitration.  Perhaps concerns about the abolition of class 
actions will further fuel their efforts.  Each of these agencies, 
however, has a limited mandate and will not be able to address all of 
the concerns raised by Concepcion. 
State legislatures have quite limited power to combat the effects of 
Concepcion given prior Supreme Court decisions.  In particular, state 
legislatures can neither prohibit mandatory arbitration nor prohibit use 
of arbitral class action waivers.  Such actions would be held 
preempted by the FAA, just as the Court in Concepcion preempted 
state courts’ finding that arbitral class action waivers are 
unconscionable.117  States might instead fight Concepcion indirectly, 
by providing more funding to state agencies that enforce laws 
protecting consumers and employees.  However, in these days of 
budget deficit it is not likely that many, if any, states will take such 
action. 
Thus, Concepcion has caused a tsunami wave that is threatening to 
eliminate many consumers’ and employees’ abilities to enforce their 
substantive rights by participating in class actions.  We must look 
primarily to Congress to take corrective action and to ensure that all 
persons continue to have access to justice. 
 
117 See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008) (preempting a state law that 
prohibited arbitration of certain claims); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 
(1996) (holding that the FAA preempted a state’s statute governing how arbitration clauses 
must be displayed in contracts). 
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